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SOME THOUGHTS ON THE EFFICACY OF A MASS TOXICS
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPENSATION SCHEME
ROBERT

L.

RABIN*

INTRODUCTION

Twentieth-century accident law has been marked by a number
of legislative attempts to devise no-fault alternatives to the tort system. In each case, these efforts have been triggered by a sense that
common-law adjudication was an overly expensive, time-consuming,
and poorly adapted process for deciding personal injury claims.'
The most far-reaching of these initiatives have been workers' compensation and automobile no-fault legislation, both of which addressed the most critical then-existing problem areas of personal
injury claims. 2 In recent years, no-fault schemes have been developed for a variety of more highly focused injury situations-ranging
3
from infant victims of medical malpractice to coal miners' disease underscoring a continuing tension between the traditional tort approach, with its focus on individual responsibility and subjective
measurement of harm, and a "categorical" system of activity-related
administrative compensation, which would provide universal coverage based on an insurance premise.
In particular, this tension has been vividly manifested in the
"mass tort" cases, where hundreds-at times, thousands-of claims
have arisen from exposure to hazardous wastes, asbestos, nucleartest fallout, and a variety of pharmaceutical products.4 Critics have
* A. Calder Mackay Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. B.S.; J.D.; Ph.D.,
Northwestern University. An earlier version of this article appeared as a chapter in the
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY,
SONAL INJURY (1991).

ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PER-

1. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Some Reflections on the Process of Tort Reform, 25 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 13 (1988) (arguing that the successful enactment of broad-based, no-fault
schemes has also been dependent on a political environment in which sweeping social
reform movements were in progress).
2. Id. at 15-23.
3. For a discussion of the Coal Miners' Health and Safety Act, see PETER S. BARTH,
THE TRAGEDY OF BLACK LUNG:

FEDERAL COMPENSATION FOR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE

(1987). The Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Act is discussed in Richard A.
Epstein, Market and Regulatory Approaches to ledical Mlalpractice: The Virginia Obstetrical NVoFault Statute, 74 VA. L. REV. 1451 (1988) and Jeffrey O'Connell, Pragmatic Constraints on
Mlarket Approaches: A Response to Professor Epstein, 74 VA. L. REV. 1475 (1988).
4. See generally MARK A. PETERSON & MOLLY SELVIN, RESOLUTION OF MASS TORTS:
TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION OF AGGREGATIVE PROCEDURES

(RAND

Institute
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argued, in essence, that the present tort system, designed to achieve
corrective justice goals in simple two-party accidental harm cases, is
not well-constituted to adjudicate effectively mass toxics episodes,
where litigation involves identifying the sources of long-latent disorders, resolving a vast array of probabilistic causation issues, dealing
with enormous numbers of parties widely distributed geographically, and other related complications. 5
These problems are well-illustrated by two of the most significant mass tort litigation explosions in the past decade, the avalanche
of claims resulting from exposure to Agent Orange and asbestos.
Both episodes have been the subject of careful study, providing descriptive and empirical data on the disabilities of the tort system.6
In the Agent Orange litigation,7 despite the guidance of an imaginative trial judge who relied on a variety of aggregative techniques to move the case to settlement, 8 the outcome compromised
every goal of the tort system: the overall award bore no discernible
relationship to the injury claims of the victim class; 9 the claimants,
for Civil Justice 1988) (evaluating the problematic nature of mass torts and the aggrega-

tive procedures adopted to facilitate their resolution).
5. See generally, e.g., PETER SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (1986); Palma J. Strand, Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort
Analysis to Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35
STAN. L. REV. 575 (1983).

6. For a discussion of the Agent Orange litigation, see SCHUCK, supra note 5. For a
discussion of the asbestos litigation, see DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE
COURTS: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS TOXIC TORTS (RAND Institute for Civil Justice 1985);
JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., VARIATION IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND Ex-

PENSES (RAND Institute for Civil Justice 1984) [hereinafter KAKALIK, VARIATION]; JAMES
S. KAKALIK ET AL., COSTS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION (RAND Institute for Civil Justice
1983) [hereinafter KAKALIK, COSTS]; Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is
There a Need for an Administrative Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819 (1992); Deborah
R. Hensler, Fashioning a National Resolution of Asbestos Personal Injury Litigation: A Reply to
Professor Brickman, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1967 (1992); Jack B. Weinstein, A View from the
Judiciary, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1957 (1992).
7. The Agent Orange litigation involved American troops who had been exposed to

Agent Orange, an herbicide used in the Vietnam War to defoliate jungles and crops to
deprive enemy forces of ground cover and food supplies. After the war, thousands of
servicemen and their families sued the United States Government and various laboratories and pharmaceutical manufacturers, claiming injuries to the veterans from various
dioxins, allegedly toxic components of Agent Orange. There are dozens of reported
opinions covering various parts of the litigation. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied sub nom. Lombardi v. Dow Chem. Co., 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
8. See SCHUCK, supra note 5, at 111-67, discussing the techniques used by United
States District Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York to arrive at a $180
million settlement.
9. See Robert L. Rabin, Tort System on Trial: The Burden of Mass Toxics Litigation, 98
YALE LJ. 813, 817-19 (1989) (reviewing SCHUCK, supra note 5).
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on the whole, appear to have been strongly alienated by the litigation process;' ° the administrative costs and delay in resolving the
controversy were enormous, even by comparison to other categories
of tort litigation-which are widely criticized on the same grounds; "
and the final award cannot be regarded as satisfying any conceivable
definition of optimal deterrence.'" In the asbestos litigation, which
has grown dramatically over the past decade and threatens to continue indefinitely, efforts at consolidation have met with only limited
success: administrative costs have reached unprecedented levels,
consuming two-thirds of every dollar expended by asbestos manufacturers in the mid-1980s before leveling off;t3 intramural dis-

agreements and deadlocks among various manufacturers and
insurance interests have erupted intermittently; 4 and similarly-situated injury victims have received vastly disparate compensation.' 5
While the mass latent injury situation-as in the case of asbestos-may represent the most troublesome dimension of this litigation phenomenon, not every instance of catastrophic injury falls
within even a broad definition of toxic harm. 1 6 Correlatively, not
every instance of mass tort litigation involves the complex problems
of determining causation and allocating responsibility that is endemic to the toxics litigation. Aviation accident litigation, a leading
illustration of "traditional" mass tort liability, provides a sharp contrast, from a litigation cost perspective, to the asbestos litigation.' 7
The RAND Institute for CivilJustice's study of the slightly more
than 2000 commercial aviation accident death cases arising between
1970 and 1984 indicated that nearly three-quarters were either con10. Id.
11. Id. at 820-22.

12. Id. at 819-20.
13. KAKALIK, COSTS, supra note 6, at viii, 38-40.
14. HENSLER, supra note 6, at 20-23.

15.
16.
lapses,
17.

See KAKALIK, VARIATION, supra note 6.
In particular, most sudden catastrophic injuries, such as fires and structural coldo not involve toxic harm.
The RAND Institute for Civil Justice conducted four studies of aviation accident

litigation. See EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES OF THE
for CivilJustice 1988) [hereinafter AVIATION

(RAND Institute
Other recent traditional mass torts

AVIATION ACCIDENT STUDY
STUDY].

include the 1980 Las Vegas MGM Grand Hotel fire that killed 84 people and injured
500, the 1986 Dupont Plaza Hotel fire in Puerto Rico that killed 97 people and
prompted damage claims totalling $1.8 billion, and the 1981 Hyatt Regency Hotel
skywalk collapse in Kansas City that killed 114 people. See Pamela G. Hollie, 1Mysteries of
Lost Life and Property Remain in Grand Hotel Ashes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1980, at Al;
Martha Brannigan, Lawyers in Suit over 1986 Hotel Fire in Puerto Rico Hold Talks on Settlement, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 1989, § 2 at 8; T.R. Reid, Litigation Loosens the Stiff Upper Lip,
WASH. POST,

Feb. 24, 1986, at Al.
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solidated in federal court or settled without a judicial filing.'" Fees
for plaintiffs' attorneys, as well as defense costs, averaged far below
the norm for tort cases 9 and, overall, almost three-quarters of average expenditures per claim resulted in payments to the claimants.2 °
Thus, the range of process-related complexities that plague
mass toxics litigation is virtually non-existent in the aviation accident and other traditional mass tort scenarios. As a consequence,
there is no substantial reason for looking beyond the toxic harm
area in assessing the case for a mass tort no-fault scheme, putting
aside consideration of a New Zealand-type universal compensation
plan. 2 '
This less-than-admirable track record of the tort system in mass
toxics cases indicates the desirability of seriously exploring nontort
strategies as an alternative. As a starting point for examining the
feasibility of nontort systems, I will discuss three existing or pro18. See AVIATION STUDY, supra note 17, at 5, 7 (noting that one-third of the cases are
settled without filing a lawsuit, and 40% result in claims in federal court). Clearly, the
overall number of cases arising during the period, 2,228, indicates-as do the occasional
fire and facility disasters-that the courts are not overwhelmed by numbers in these
cases, as they have been in the toxic mass tort episodes.
19. Plaintiffs' litigation costs were between 15% and 25%; defendants' related costs
averaged about 14% of compensation paid per death. AVIATION STUDY, supra note 17, at
11-14. For comparable overall figures on personal injury torts, see generally JAMES S.
KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION
(RAND Institute for Civil Justice 1986) (providing extensive statistical analysis of costs
in tort litigation).
It should be noted, however, that there is very frequently no substantial doubt as to
liability in airline crash cases; as a consequence, the low litigation cost figures may simply reflect a correspondingly reduced work effort required in order to secure a
settlement.
20. AVIATION STUDY, supra note 17, at 3. On the other side of the ledger, the aviation
cases demonstrated the same skewed pattern of recoveries found for decades in automobile accident compensation studies, namely, a continuum on which victims suffering minor economic loss tend to get overcompensated while those incurring major economic
loss are systematically undercompensated. There is reason to believe, however, that this
phenomenon is diminishing in the airline cases and that it may, in any event, have been
substantially an artifact of the RAND methodology in imputing values to categories of
lost services. Telephone Interview with James S. Kakalik, RAND Institute for Civil Justice (Aug. 16, 1989).
21. While a comprehensive no-fault scheme along the lines of New Zealand's is almost certainly politically infeasible in the United States at this time, focused no-fault in
other claims areas warrants exploration. See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL (1991) (discussing no-fault medical liability); Paul C. Weiler, The Casefor
No-Fault Medical Liability, 52 MD. L. REV. 908 (1993). For recent critical treatments of
the New Zealand system, see Richard Mahoney, New Zealand's Accident Compensation
Scheme: A Reassessment, 40 AM.J. COMP. L. 159 (1992); Richard S. Miller, An Analyvsis and
Critique of the 1992 Changes to New Zealand's Accident Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV.
1070 (1993); Richard S. Miller, The Futureof New Zealand's Accident Compensation Scheme, I l
U. HAW. L. REV. 1 (1989) [hereinafter Miller, The Future].
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posed institutional schemes: the statutory tort remedy for nuclear
accidents, the legislative no-fault scheme for vaccine injuries, and
two study-group proposals for toxics-related harms. Against the
backdrop of the promising characteristics and potential weaknesses
of these schemes, I will then proceed to describe the optimal features of a toxics no-fault model and to assess the case for its
adoption.
I.

Toxics
A.

COMPENSATION SCHEMES:

EXPLORATORY MODELS

Tort/No-Fault Hybrid. The Price-Anderson Act

The Price-Anderson Act 2 2 signaled one of the first legislative
responses to perceived deficiencies of the common-law tort model
in dealing with potential mass tort liability. Congress passed the Act
in 1957 with the express intent of encouraging investment in nuclear energy research and operations by a private sector daunted by
the prospect of multimillion dollar claims and a constrained insurance market. 23 Overall, the Act imposes a set of statutory constraints on possible catastrophic tort liability in the event of a
nuclear accident, and has essentially established a hybrid system
that combines components of both tort and no-fault compensation
models.
The system is financed through a combination of private insurance and mandatory contributions to a common fund-contributions that, in the aggregate, set the limit on total liability for any
nuclear incident.2 4 In accordance with recent amendments to the
Act, each nuclear licensee is required to purchase $160 million of
private liability insurance. 2 5 In addition, each licensee must contribute $63 million to a common compensation fund in the event of a
nuclear accident at any plant. 26 The liability limit of the fund, with
more than 100 plants in operation, is approximately $7 billion at
27
present.
The Price-Anderson Act funding scheme closely resembles a
no-fault model to the extent that it relies substantially on a pooling
mechanism to compensate aggrieved parties, thus de-emphasizing
the importance of individual responsibility. This pooling mechanism, in conjunction with the lack of an experience- or risk-rating
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
Id. § 2012 (detailing the congressional findings).
Id. §§ 2210(b) & (e).
Id.; see also The Nation, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1988, at 2 [hereinafter The Nation].
42 U.S.C. § 2210(b).
See The Nation, supra note 25, at 2.
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provision in the statute, blunts the incentives to investment in optimal safety by individual firms under the Price-Anderson Act. At the
same time, however, the nontort disincentives to sub-optimal safety,
in particular the devastating disability and damage to the plant that
would result from a serious nuclear accident, are very powerful.
In the event of an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence, ' 28 all
claims are consolidated in federal court in the district where the incident occurred.2 ' The Act creates strict liability in tort for licensees
involved in nuclear incidents and abrogates the defense of contributory negligence. 3' By consolidating all claims into one jurisdiction
and applying a single body of law, the Price-Anderson Act incorporates certain features of the "public-law" tort model.3 '
With respect to establishing liability, however, the Price-Anderson Act maintains some of the distinctive flavor of traditional tort
law. The claims process retains a two-party character, with each individual claimant bearing the burden of establishing causation and
particularized proof of economic loss and intangible harm. 2 In this
sense, the Price-Anderson approach, in practice, might prove to be
almost as inefficient as the standard common-law tort approach.
Allen v. United States,3 3 a case filed under the Federal Tort
Claims Act by alleged victims of the Nevada atomic bomb tests of
the 1950s, provides a tort analogue that illustrates how causation
and damage issues under Price-Anderson might be resolved in practice. After a three-month trial, the district court judge in Allen carefully distinguished among the variety of claims on the basis of
medical literature on the etiology of various cancers, observational
reports on the Nevada fall-out, and testimony about victim exposure. 34 Based on this evidence the judge allowed some claims, but
35
denied others.
Though the judge appears to have mastered the relevant scientific literature, Allen engenders deep pessimism about the efficacy of
28. "Extraordinary nuclear occurrence" is defined as "any event causing a discharge
or dispersal of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material ... in amounts offsite, or
causing radiation levels offsite." 42 U.S.C. § 2014(j).
29. Id. § 2210(n)(2).
30. Id. § 2210(n)(1).
31. For an articulation of the "public law" tort model, see David Rosenberg, The
Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A 'Public Law" 'ision of the Tort System, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 851 (1984).
32. See 10 C.F.R. § 140.81 (1993).
33. 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
34. See id.
35. Id. at 247-48.
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a Price-Anderson approach. The case took five years to dispose of
at the trial court level, and, even if the case had been affirmed, 6 it
still would have left many types of claims open to dispute and further litigation. 3 7 The underlying problem in Allen arose from the
retention of an individualized approach to damages and causation,
which ensured a prolonged and costly process of decision. Similar
problems would be virtually certain to arise in adjudication under
38
Price-Anderson.
Optimally, successful plaintiffs would collect from the fund the
full extent of their proven economic and non-economic damages.
However, Price-Anderson empowers the court to reduce the size of
present claims proportionately when it appears that the ceiling on
damages will be exceeded. 9 In these situations, the court is to establish a delayed injury fund, setting aside part of the pooled contributions and insurance for claims arising within twenty years of the
incident.4 °
36. The case was, in fact, reversed on the basis of the discretionary act exemption of
the Federal Tort Claims Act. See Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
37. Only 24 of 1,192 claims were actually tried. The 24 plaintiffs were chosen because their claims were thought representative of the plaintiffs as a whole. This selection of "typical" cases was made in order to provide a legal and factual context in which
to try the remaining claims; these cases would not, however, have been dispositive of the
issues in the remaining claims. Allen, 588 F. Supp. at 258.
38. In recognition of these shortcomings, a recent comprehensive review of PriceAnderson recommends generic determinations of causation and scheduled treatment of
nonpecuniary loss as elements in a package of "administrative features designed to
speed the resolution of cases." See REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FROM PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS 5-10

(1990).

39. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(o).
40. Id. In the mid-1970s, a federal no-fault scheme for commercial aviation accident
victims was proposed, which, according to its author, was modeled on Price-Anderson.
See William F. Kennedy, Accidents in CommercialAir Transportation- A ProposedReform of the
Liability and Compensation System, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 247 (1975). Like Price-Anderson,
the aviation scheme would establish activity-related liability by eliminating the fault inquiry-and, indeed, would establish a very expansive definition of causal responsibility,
since the carrier would also be liable for damage resulting from sabotage. Id. at 250-51.
There would also be a governmental indemnity provision for liability in excess of privately available insurance-a key provision, now superseded, of the Price-Anderson approach. Id. at 249-50. Finally, there would be consolidation of all cases in the federal
court where the accident occurred, as under the nuclear incident legislation. Id. at 252.
But there are some critical differences in the approach. Kennedy would have federal indemnification financed from a surcharge on airline tickets, rather than the general
revenue strategy adopted in the original Price-Anderson scheme. Id. Moreover, there is
no provision for pooling of liability among the carriers above the insurance limits;
rather, the government fund is an exclusive and unlimited source of indemnification. Id.
at 249-50. Also, the aviation plan eliminates pain and suffering liability except in cases
of "permanent disfigurement or disability," which presumably would be fairly common
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Narrowly Focused No-Fault: The National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act of 1986

The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986" (the Vaccine Act) is, in essence, a narrowly focused no-fault compensation
package affording relief to a designated class of product usersnamely, children injured by exposure to certain government-mandated vaccines. Congress passed the Act in response to the concerns of the vaccine manufacturers, who had threatened to withdraw
from the market because of anxieties about the possibility of crushing liability resulting from the infrequent but unavoidable injuries
from exposure to vaccines." Like the Price-Anderson Act, the Vaccine Act created an alternative to common-law tort liability to induce the private sector to make available products deemed essential
to the public interest.
The compensation fund is financed by an excise tax on each
dose of vaccine disbursed.4 3 Because most vaccine manufacturers
enjoy a near-monopoly position, a rise in the excise tax to pay an
increased number of claims would probably not affect any manufacturer's market share. A limited measure of nontort deterrence pressure is probably assured, however, by the political repercussions
that might well accompany any significant rise in the price of
vaccines.
The Act establishes a two-tier system under which alleged victims first proceed under a no-fault approach, but retain the secondary option of pursuing a tort claim.4 4 Plaintiffs initially file claims
in federal court, where a special master is appointed to gather evidence and determine the award. 45 The claimant must establish injury from a vaccine listed in the Vaccine Injury Table, demonstrate
that the malady is on the list provided in the table, and prove that
the adverse reaction occurred within an exposure period designated
among survivors-although, on the other hand, survival itself is quite uncommon. Id. at
252.
The proposal was never adopted. One can speculate that the earlier-discussed capacity of the tort system to deal in a reasonably effective fashion with these "traditional"
mass tort cases explains the relatively limited political appeal of the initiative.
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to 300aa-33 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
42. See, e.g., Marlene Cimons, Vaccine Injury Compensation Plan Urged to .MlaintainProduction Despite Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 1985, at 4.
43. See, e.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, Claims and Counterclaims on Vaccine Costs Generate Heat
but Little Light, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1993, at A16.

44. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa- 1, 300aa-21.
45. Id. § 300aa-ll(a).
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in the table.4 6 Claimants establishing these conditions create a
nearly irrefutable presumption of liability. By attempting to eliminate contentious issues of causation, the Act is designed to settle
claims in a more efficient manner than would the Price-Anderson
Act.
Similarly, the Vaccine Act provides a straightforward means of
measuring damages. The statute covers unlimited actual medical
expenses, as well as costs of rehabilitation.4 7 In addition, it provides
compensation for lost earning power based on the average earnings
of workers in the nonfarm sector of the economy, determined annually on a prospective basis. 4" The only indeterminate measure of
damages is for pain and suffering, which may be awarded by the
special master to a limit of $250,000.1 9 Thus, the Act strikes a balance between scheduled and individualized compensation, and, with
the exception of retaining a scaled-down discretionary decision on
pain and suffering, assesses damages in a simple and administratively efficient manner.
The claimant is entitled to reject the special master's award and
seek tort relief instead, but a number of disincentives are built in to
discourage this option. First, the Act adopts the principle of the Restatement (Second) of Torts that allows an appropriate warning to provide a good defense against liability. 50 Additionally, the Act adopts
the "learned intermediary" doctrine, which requires the manufacturers to provide adequate notice only to the party administering the
vaccination. 5 1 Finally, the manufacturer is protected against punitive damage awards if it is in compliance with the federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act.52
In the final analysis, it must be emphasized that the compensation problem addressed by the vaccine statute is rather narrow in
scope. A relatively predictable, limited number of cases arise annually, and filed claims most often involve a single injured party alleging damages against an identifiable manufacturer after a generally
short latency period. The scientific information linking adverse reactions with a limited number of identified diseases is reliable in
most situations. Thus, establishing liability under the Vaccine In46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. § 300aa-ll(c).
Id. § 300aa-15(a).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 300aa-22(b). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(c).
Id. § 300aa-15(d), 300aa-23(d).

§ 402 cmt. k (1977).
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jury Table is unproblematic in many cases. 5 3 Consequently, the relevance of the vaccine statute to troublesome and complicated
environmental or drug cases, with their mass tort, long-latency,
identification, and causation problems, is far from clear.
C.

Expansive No-Faultfor Toxic Harms: Superfund Section 301(e)
Study Group Report and Environmental Law Institute
Model Statute

The Superfund Section 301(e) Study Group Report 54 and the
ELI Model Statute 5 5 both propose no-fault compensation schemes
for victims of toxic-related harms. Like the vaccine statute, both allow claimants the opportunity to pursue tort remedies if they are
dissatisfied with the no-fault determinations. Unlike the Price-Anderson Act or the vaccine statute, however, neither proposal has
been legislatively adopted. Because the Superfund and ELI proposals are relatively similar in scope, they will be considered together.
The Superfund proposal was developed as a byproduct of the
Superfund legislation of 1980. As such, the scope of the proposal is
limited to compensating harm that arises from exposure to a hazardous waste-defined by reference to a Toxic Substance Document
prepared by a designated agency-that was released from a site
qualified for cleanup under the Act. 5 6 The ELI proposal is considerably broader, extending coverage to harms arising from exposure to
a list of "hazardous chemical substances" that includes toxics presently designated under federal statutory schemes or subsequently
listed under a petitioning process implemented by the fund adminis53. Recent accounts indicate, however, that claims resolution under the statute may
not be as straightforward as was initially anticipated. Some claimants are filing lengthy
appeals to rejected claims, and scientific study panels are calling into question the
linkage between the vaccine and many adverse effects. A considerable backlog of unresolved cases and a shortfall in funding has also plagued the system-although the
latter problems seem limited to pre-fund cases, which are earmarked for compensation
out of general revenues, rather than the fund. See Laura Mazzuca, Shot Through with
Problems; a PartialSuccess, Vaccine Injury Fund Faces Case Logjam, Funding Shortfalls, Bus. INS.,
Aug. 24, 1992, at 1; Warren E. Leary, Panel Discounts Many Adverse Effects Tied to Childhood
Vaccines, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1991, at 10A.

54. REPORT TO CONGRESS IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 301(E) OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980, 97TH
CONG., 2D SESS., INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES-ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter SUPERFUND REPORT].
55. See Jeffrey Trauberman, Statutory Reform of "Toxic Torts ".- Relieving Legal, Scientific,
and Economic Burdens on the Chemical Victim, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 250-96 (1983)
(appending, at the end of the article, the text of the Environmental Law Institute's
Model Statute) [hereinafter ELI MODEL STATUTE].
56. SUPERFUND REPORT, supra note 54, at 191-92.
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trator. 5 7 Consequently, the ELI proposal would cover harm resulting from exposure to a far wider array of actual or potential toxic
agents, including asbestos, Agent Orange, and drugs.
The Superfund proposal would be financed in a manner analogous to the current Superfund design, relying on a tax levied on the
production of toxic chemicals, crude oil and the disposal of hazardous waste. 5' The ELI proposal would impose a tax on petroleum
and chemical production as well, but would also phase in an annual
hazard fee that would reflect the risk-generating characteristics of
the substances produced. 59 To the extent that this variable fee is
scientifically feasible, the ELI financing scheme is superior to the
Superfund scheme from the perspective of creating appropriate incentives to safety.
The adjudication of claims under the two proposals is very similar. The initial no-fault determination under the Superfund scheme
addresses causation by a statutory rebuttable presumption, triggered when the claimant establishes that (1) the alleged source of
the toxin was engaged at the time of exposure in the generation,
transportation or disposal of hazardous waste, (2) the claimant was
exposed to the hazardous waste, and (3) the injury suffered by the
claimant was of the kind known to result from such exposure. 60 The
fund would use a Toxic Substance Document, analogous to the Vaccine Injury Table, to assess the claimant's right to recovery. 6
Damages awarded under the Superfund proposal would include
all medical expenses and two-thirds of lost income up to a high ceiling.62 Depending on the earning power of an individual claimant,
the Superfund proposal would be either more or less generous than
the vaccine statute in compensating for lost wages. The Superfund
scheme would not, however, allow any recovery for pain and
suffering.

63

If a claimant were dissatisfied with the no-fault award, she
would be allowed to initiate a tort claim.6 4 Like the vaccine statute,
the Superfund scheme creates disincentives to make this option
unattractive. Among other provisions, if the tort award is less than
twenty-five percent above the no-fault award, the plaintiff must pay
57. ELI MODEL STATUTE, supra note 55, at 254.
58. SUPERFUND REPORT, supra note 54, at 230.
59. ELI MODEL STATUTE, supra note 55, at 272-78.
60. SUPERFUND REPORT, supra note 54, at 198-99.

61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

199-202.
219.
220.
181-83.
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court costs and the expert witness fees of the defendant.6 5 In addition, the fund must be reimbursed for all payments disbursed under
the administrative compensation scheme.6 6 The ELI proposal creates a far more substantial disincentive to sue by requiring that a
claimant return
any benefit payments to the fund prior to initiating a
67
tort suit.

Creating such disincentives, however, raises an important
equity concern. To ensure fairness to potential claimants, both proposals would need careful scrutiny to ensure that statutory award
levels are sufficiently generous to avoid the possibility that claimants
would be coerced into accepting a dubious bargain under the nofault scheme.
Several other problematic aspects of the ELI proposal deserve
attention. It is unclear whether the ELI version of the Toxic Substance Document would provide a scientifically sound, yet efficient
basis for resolving the vexing problems of causation. The ELI proposal also leaves unresolved the method of shifting claims initiated
in the tort system to the no-fault scheme, once the hazardous nature
of a product is well documented. Finally, there is a threshold question whether the tort system has been an indispensable institutional
mechanism-through pretrial discovery and the litigation processfor identifying toxic health hazards in the first instance.6 8
D. Emerging Themes
A system designed to achieve corrective justice goals in twoparty accidental harm cases simply cannot be accommodated effectively to the demands of mass tort cases where the litigation involves
identifying the source(s) of long-latent toxic disorders.6" Before the
traditional tort system is abandoned, however, there must be substantial grounds to ensure confidence in an alternative institutional
mechanism that would serve as its replacement. This survey of toxic
no-fault approaches has addressed the problem in a preliminary way
by examining three alternative institutional schemes: the statutory
tort remedy for nuclear accidents, the legislative no-fault scheme for
vaccine injuries, and two study-group proposals for toxics-related
65. Id.
66. Id.

67. ELI

MODEL STATUTE, supra note 55, at 286.
68. See, e.g., PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON
TRIAL 97-131 (1985) (describing the use of discovery to assemble medical evidence on
the dangers of exposure to asbestos).
69. See supra notes 5-15 and accompanying text.
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harms. Not surprisingly, the analysis suggests that each approach
has some significant limitations and weaknesses, in addition to certain promising features, as a conceptual model for addressing more
generally the critical problem of mass toxic harm.
The ELI Model Statute offers the most comprehensive definition of a designated compensable event. However, the Model Statute relies on a dynamic process of identifying toxic sources and
establishing exposure-reaction relationships that may be excessively
optimistic about advances in scientific understanding, let alone
prospects for rational administration.
Even if the scope of no-fault coverage can be defined with reasonable precision, there are compelling reasons to think that the
tort option will need to be retained in part. Once again, the models
serve as a useful mechanism for approaching the problem: the vaccine scheme, the Superfund Study Group proposal, and the ELI
Model Statute each adopt distinctive approaches to the question of
the extent to which the tort system should be retained and whether
a binding election between alternatives should be required.
Whatever no-fault trigger is devised, there is a correlative set of
questions about the design of the residual tort system. Here, the
Price-Anderson Act may point in a fruitful direction. Perhaps the
novel funding approach, the singular limitations on defenses, and
the restraints on individualized damage recoveries ought to be features of the retained tort option, since these strategies are more
consonant with a dominant commitment to no-fault than is the
traditional tort remedy. 70 Conversely, if the no-fault model is
predominantly aimed at diminishing the caseload by disposing of
less-compelling claims, a more robust residual tort remedy for serious cases might be appropriate.
The manner of financing the no-fault scheme turns on the question of the appropriate means of optimizing product safety. Once
again, the models differ sharply in their commitment to establishing
accident-prevention incentives. Arguably, the deterrence function
is best left to a complementary regulatory system; the Superfund
Study Group proposal and Price-Anderson tacitly adopt this philosophy. By contrast, the Vaccine Act and ELI approach contain explicit design features aimed at encouraging optimal safety. The
question of which approach seems most sensible depends in part on
the scope of the designated compensable event; a tightly-circumscribed, sharply-defined definition of compensable claims-and,
70. See supra notes 22-40 and accompanying text.
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concomitantly, of responsible enterprises-is more amenable to experience-based financing than is a broad and indeterminate all-inclusive category of product and environmental harms.
In sum, this exploration of no-fault models has identified a
number of critical issues: designating a compensable event, retaining or discarding the tort system, and allocating funding responsibility among contributing sources. There are no clear-cut
resolutions of these issues, but each must be addressed if the prospect of an administrative compensation scheme is to be taken
seriously.
II.

ELEMENTS OF A MASS Toxic HARM ADMINISTRATIVE
COMPENSATION SCHEME

A.

Designatinga Compensable Event

The starting point in any discussion of the components of an
administrative compensation scheme is the boundaries questionthe determination of which claims fall within the system and which
remain under the domain of tort. This issue is far more complicated
than the comparable inquiry in a traditional tort case as to whether
an actionable claim has been made out. Apart from common-law
no-duty limitations, a claim for recovery in a traditional tort case
need not be shaped to fit within a carefully circumscribed definition
of harm. By contrast, the jurisdiction of an administrative compensation scheme is premised on the existence of an activity-related
nexus between the claimant's harm and the fund's obligation. A
second-stage inquiry into specific causation takes place only after
this jurisdictional requirement has been met-a requirement that

will be referred to as the need to establish a designated compensable event (DCE).
The limits of the fund's jurisdiction must, of course, be responsive to the purposes that the administrative compensation scheme
are intended to serve. This threshold definitional issue would be
entirely unproblematic, for example, if the tort system were regarded as inadequate for adjudicating every act or activity that generated one hundred or more claims of personal harm. As suggested
earlier, however, there is no substantial argument for defining the
jurisdiction of a compensation scheme solely in quantifiable terms

rather than adopting a universal no-fault scheme as in New Zealand. 7 To put it another way, neither the single-event mass tort
71. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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injury (the airline crash, hotel fire, or structural collapse) nor the
"serial" aggregative injury scenario (for example, a large number of
discrete personal injuries resulting over a relatively lengthy period
from a faulty brake design) creates either singular process difficulties for the tort system or distinctive fairness and/or efficiency
claims for no-fault reparation. Instead, as discussed above, it is the
conjunction of a high volume of claims and singular difficulties in
resolving causation questions that has made the toxic tort cases a
prime candidate for institutional reform through adoption of a "se72
lective" administrative compensation scheme.
As a consequence, there is a threshold question whether a nofault toxics scheme should be highly focused (as would be true of an
asbestos victims' act), middle-range in focus (as in the Superfund
hazardous waste proposal), or broad in coverage (as would be the
case if all foreseeable high-volume toxic torts were the target). This
question, at least, can be fairly definitively answered.
Consider first a highly focused approach. At present, there is
no discernible single product, or family of products, that possesses
the singular combination of characteristics that weighed in favor of
(partial) tort replacement in the case of vaccines-specifically, high
social utility, involuntary government-mandated exposure, and seriously threatened sources of supply. Similarly, if present catastrophic occurrences-like asbestos-are put to one side, there are
no clear ex ante indicia of the next specific product that will overwhelm the system in a comparable manner.
For rather different reasons, there is only a weak argument for a
middle-range definition of toxic harm. The Superfund Study Group
proposal, which defined the scope of its compensation plan in middle-range terms (harm arising out of exposure to hazardous waste
sites), 73 was implementing a legislatively circumscribed mandate
that need not constrain an independent observer. In fact, despite
the notoriety of Love Canal, Times Beach, and a handful of other
site-related clusters of damage claims, 4 there are as yet no instances
72. This is not to suggest that selective extensions of no-fault would be justified only
where accidental harm is characterized by numerosity of claims and long latency. See 1
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 335-47 (1991) [hereinafter ALl REPORT]; 2 ALl REPORT, supra, at 285-300

(discussing arguments that the tort system is a problematic mechanism for resolving
accident claims in the industrial accident and medical malpractice areas).
73. See supra text accompanying note 56.
74. In the late 1970s, the discovery of seeping chemicals forced the evacuation of
hundreds of people from their homes in Love Canal, New York. In 1982, high concentrations of dioxin prompted the evacuation of all 2240 residents of Times Beach, Mis-
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in which a mass tort case arising out of a hazardous waste site has
seriously overwhelmed the courts or clearly discriminated against a
75
large class of injury victims.
While the past is not necessarily a guide to the future, certain
key aspects of hazardous waste harm suggest that, at most, these
claims will create peripheral process and compensation-related difficulties in the future. Most importantly, the mass tort dimension of a
hazardous waste case is generally geographically limited. As such,
the litigation and settlement process is relatively free of the logistical difficulties arising when exposure or ingestion occurs on a nationwide basis, as in the asbestos and DES litigation. Thus, the
prospect of multidistrict litigation and choice-of-law issues, far-flung
networks of attorneys, and an extraordinary number of personal injury claims is diminished.
This is not to suggest that hazardous waste claims should be
outside the scope of an administrative compensation scheme-in a
realistic scenario, numerosity would surely be satisfied, long latency
problems would be present, and background risk (as well as synergistic effects) would pose serious causation issues. Rather, the point
is that hazardous waste-related harm seems an inappropriately narrow basis for defining the outer limits of a toxics no-fault scheme.7 6
souri. See Keith Schneider, Experts Say Environmental Policy Lacks Focus, Wastes Billions,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 21, 1993, at 8A.
75. See 2 ALI REPORT, supra note 72, at 353-58.

76. Another "middle-range" focus, in addition to hazardous wastes, would be pharmaceutical harms. A drug no-fault scheme exhibits some of the same difficulties as a
hazardous waste scheme, however, and generates problems of its own. A drug no-fault
scheme would likely raise serious political objections. It is interesting to note that the
most vociferous critics of tort liability for drug-related injuries have proposed regulatory
preemption of any victim compensation (under appropriate circumstances), rather than
demonstrating enthusiasm for no-fault recovery. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY:
THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 210-15 (1988); Note, A Question of Competence: TheJudicialRole in the Regulation of Pharmaceuticals, 103 HARV. L. REV. 773, 785-93
(1990).
A pharmaceutical no-fault scheme could be viewed as excessively narrow in its application; many of the most vexing mass tort cases-Agent Orange, asbestos, and even,
perhaps, Dalkon Shield-would fall outside the purview of the scheme. The core problem is that a drug-related plan would be limited, in essence, to harm from ingestion
rather than exposure, and many of the serious cases involving causal lags, indeterminate
harm, and mass victims fall into the exposure category.
At the same time, such a scheme could be viewed, along another dimension, as too
broad in coverage. By sweeping in all drug cases, the plan would be applicable to a
substantial volume of claims that would be largely indistinguishable from ordinary, defective-product litigation. To put it simply, most drug cases involve immediate sideeffects to a relatively limited number of victims and raise no intractable causation issues.
See generally Richard A. Merrill, Compensationfor PrescriptionDrug Injuries, 59 VA. L. REV. 1
(1973) (describing the reasons that prescription drugs present hazards and evaluating
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The data on mass tort litigation claims to the present date underscore the last point, and effect a transition to considerations of a
broad-based DCE. A RAND Institute for Civil Justice study suggests that, as of mid-1988, the three leading sources of mass tort
litigation were the Dalkon Shield (325,000 claims), Agent Orange
(250,000 claims) and asbestos (more than 87,000 claims). 7 7 Moreover, among the twelve leading sources of claims were four pharmaceutical products (MER/29, DES, Dalkon Shield, and Bendectin)
and seven others that would not fit within the scope of a "hazardous
waste" limitation on jurisdiction, no matter how broadly defined.78
Putting aside mass accidents such as the hotel fire cases, then, the
appropriate scope of an administrative compensation scheme ap79
pears to be linked to a broad definition of toxic harm.
How might such a definition be framed? The three critical elements that need to be established in a toxics claims case are: (1) a
chemical substance that generates a substantial risk of harm, (2)
harm of the designated kind, and (3) exposure to a source of the
named substance. The standard approach, represented by both the
ELI and Superfund proposals, has been to create a rebuttable presumption of liability once these elements have been established. It
seems likely that this presumption would, in applicable cases, be
very difficult to overcome. On the other hand, it is anything but
apparent that such a presumption would be available in a wide variety of toxic harm cases-indeed, this is the key question that goes to
the core of the DCE issue.
Consider, initially, the question of which chemical (toxic) substances would fall within the compensation plan. Under the least
problematic no-fault scheme, the Vaccine Act, the chemical substances that generate the designated harms are listed in the statute
itself. Only in the infrequent case of a "signature disease," howthe legal issues in recovering for the harms suffered). Moreover, an important subset of
cases raise warning issues (user responsibility), third-party intermediary difficulties, or
synergistic effects questions (multiple drug use) that seriously undermine the prospects
for equitable implementation of a no-fault approach. These difficulties raise broader
fairness and political issues when establishing a funding allocation mechanism for a drug
no-fault plan. For all of these reasons, there is serious reason to doubt the efficacy and
feasibility of a focused pharmaceutical no-fault scheme.
77. See PETERSON & SELVIN, supra note 4, at 6.
78. Id. The single exception is a release of DDT by a pesticide manufacturer in
Northern Alabama. In addition, three of the other high volume claims cases arose out of
"traditional" mass tort litigation: the MGM Grand and Dupont Plaza fires, and the Hyatt skywalk collapse cases. See supra note 17.
79. The reasons for putting aside traditional mass torts are discussed above. See
supra text accompanying notes 17-20.
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ever, will such an approach be workable. Under the broader conception presently being considered, the statutory designation would
make reference to a broad definition of "toxic harm," and a regulatory mechanism would be established to give specific meaning to the
provision.
The Superfund and ELI approaches are suggestive, on this
score. In order to capitalize on existing scientific information and
expertise, the no-fault scheme could list presently designated substances for which some version of a toxic substance document has
been prepared by a federal or state agency. In addition, a mechanism is required to provide flexibility in the system-to assure that
the scheme has a dynamic character that is sensitive to new scientific
findings about the toxicity of chemical substances. The most suitable strategy would be a petitioning process that offered interested
parties an opportunity to submit data on toxic risks associated with
unlisted substances to a science panel and, indeed, encouraged the
panel itself to initiate the process of listing new substances when
appropriate.8 0
Even those steps would not suffice, however. Critical information about the toxic risks of a product or substance in some cases is
initially brought to public attention through the litigation process
itself, as in the Dalkon Shield and asbestos litigation. This is not to
suggest that product manufacturers necessarily lack information
about the magnitude of risks associated with their products prior to
the onset of mass tort litigation, but rather to recognize that, in the
real world, governmental sources-including an administrative
compensation board staffed with science experts-simply would not
have access to this information before claims of toxic harm began to
surface in the tort system.
The logical solution, which has not been addressed in earlier
proposed model acts, is to establish a "switching mechanism" that
channels burgeoning judicial claims into the administrative compensation system prior to the resolution of numerous claims (in court or
through pretrial settlement) and the resultant incurrence of enor80. See generally Troyen A. Brennan, Helping Courts with Toxic Torts: Some Proposals Regarding Alternative Methods for Presenting and Assessing Scientific Evidence in Common Law
Courts, 51 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1 (1989) (detailing the roles of a science panel in toxics litigation); Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469 (1988) (proposing
establishment of a science panel to evaluate causation issues). But see Michael D. Green,
Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of .4gent
Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U.L. REV. 643, 696 (1992) (identifying weaknesses
of a science panel approach to causation issues).
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mous litigation costs. A "switching mechanism" would raise both a
fairness issue-treating like claims similarly, rather than having
early cases resolved in the judicial forum and later ones before the
compensation board-and an administrative cost concern. This
early warning system, an essential complement to the petitioning
process, could be implemented through a special judicial panelalong the lines of the multidistrict litigation panel-that would be
designated to entertain motions for transfer of claims to the administrative compensation scheme under standards aimed at identifying
incipient mass toxics cases.
This switching mechanism would need to be worked out in
some detail. Unless a provision for court-awarded attorneys' fees to
the initiators of the transferred cases were adopted, there would be
little incentive for lawyers to handle toxic cases that prospectively
would be routed into the compensation scheme. Similarly, once
transfer had occurred, special treatment would be required in this
category of cases as far as the creation of rebuttable presumptions is
concerned. While it would be possible to employ the science panel
at the motion-to-transfer stage of the judicial proceedings, it seems
more likely that decisions about substantiality of risk-that is,
whether a substance should be "listed"-would be made once the
claims were before the compensation board, as in the other categories of designated compensable events.
The dominant thrust of this rather complex, three-pronged
process would be to establish generic listings of toxic substances
and related harms, along the lines of the Vaccine Act. These listings
could serve as the basis for the disposition of mass toxics claims
without the time-consuming, costly inquiry into causal relationsinvariably side-tracked by collateral legal issues and lawyers' procedural wrangling-that has come to characterize toxic tort litigation.
Much of toxic tort litigation expense is consumed, however, by
the nongeneric demands of a toxics case-the issue of individual exposure-and it is essential to consider the corresponding
nongeneric dimension of the statutory presumption process. Satisfying this final element in a toxics no-fault compensation case presumably would necessitate the same reliance on case-by-case
determinations as in the tort system. Of course, it would in some
instances be possible to streamline the process by creating subcategories of representative cases based on "typical" patterns of exposure and pathology, but this device has also been employed in mass
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tort litigation."' The salient question seems to be whether there
would be substantial gains in fairness and efficiency by shifting these
individualized factual inquiries from the judicial and pretrial settlement processes to an administrative forum. The far-greater lawyering costs imposed by the tort system must be weighed against the
prospective bureaucratic biases of an administrative decision-making apparatus; it comes down to an institutional choice between
trial-or settlement in the shadow of litigation-and a specialized
administrative processing and distribution system. It seems highly
unlikely, even in an administrative system, that a panel of scientific
experts would be utilized for these case-by-case decisions, as contrasted to the generic determinations to list toxic substances.
Once the jurisdiction of the compensation scheme is expanded
to incorporate a broad definition of toxics, still another troublesome
feature of individualized claims treatment must be confronted;
namely, the potential contribution of the claimant to her own injury.
On this count, however, recourse to established no-fault models
may point the way to a resolution. The fundamental premise of a
no-fault system is informed by insurance considerations rather than
an effort to achieve two-party justice. In view of this premise, workers' compensation and automobile no-fault plans generally provide
an exceedingly limited bar for victim fault. The notion is that compensation is a more important goal of the system than promoting
optimal accident prevention measures-which, of course, may be
pursued in some cases through other regulatory strategies. The
same, straightforward argument can be made for compensating
even those drug-injury victims who fail to abide by the terms of a
warning label, assuming the statutory criteria for a rebuttable presumption have otherwise been met. 2
81. See, e.g., Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (applying
a collective adjudication scheme to a large class of asbestos plaintiffs); Allen v. United
States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984) (litigating 24 "bellweather" claims to establish
framework for future claims), rev'd on other grounds, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988). For recent discussions of Cimino and the benefits of aggregation of mass tort cases, see Michael J. Saks & Peter D. Blanck, Justice Improved: The
Unrecognized.Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV.
815, 819-26 (1992); Glen 0. Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort
Law, 78 VA. L. REV. 1481, 1490-96 (1992). See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation: PostaggregativeProcedurein Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475
(1991) (exploring the feasibility of ajudicial approach to resolving the asbestos litigation
through consolidation techniques).
82. By contrast, substantial arguments can be made for a strong warning-defense in
product-related tort cases. See Alan Schwartz & W. Kip Viscusi, The Appropriate Role
of Warnings in Connection with Product-Related Accidents (1991) (working paper pre-
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If this circumscription of a bar for victim carelessness remains
troublesome, it should be noted that the issue is likely to be purely
academic: in no case, to date, has a mass tort episode arisen in8 3a
situation where victims failed to respect the terms of a warning.
Rather, the mass toxics cases have arisen out of risks that were unknown to the victim-class at the time the product was marketed and,
indeed, throughout much of the period of latency. There is no apparent reason to think that this scenario will be less likely in the
future.
B.

Setting Limits on Compensation

A second important set of issues that must be resolved in fashioning an administrative compensation approach focuses on how
much reparation will be provided. The first-order issues are
straightforward. As in any no-fault scheme, an initial determination
must be made whether any limits will be placed on the recovery of
medical expenses and lost earnings, and whether recovery will be
allowed for intangible loss. As far as economic loss is concerned,
there seems no reason to depart from the typical practice under
workers' compensation and the environmental no-fault proposals:
recovery would be allowed for all reasonable medical expenses and
a substantial proportion of lost earnings-perhaps two-thirds, with
an indexed ceiling on total allowable recovery. With regard to intangible loss, the trade-off arguments applicable to any full-blown
no-fault scheme-universal coverage from an insurance perspective
in return for elimination of costly discretionary decisions about individualized responsibility and harm-also operate in the mass toxics
area. Indeed, the focus of the toxics scheme on mass harm gives
special force to the administrative cost-cutting underpinning for the
trade-off argument. Thus, intangible loss would best be denied,
although a modest, lump-sum schedule of awards for designated
"serious" disabling conditions would be a viable option. In all of
these respects, the issues related to compensation levels and categories under a toxic harm no-fault scheme are not distinctive in
character.
pared in connection with the American Law Institute study, see ALl REPORT, supra note
72). See also 2 ALI REPORT, supra note 72, at 57-82.
83. Cigarette smoking would constitute a major exception to this rule if counted as a
prospective candidate for relief under a toxics compensation scheme. For a discussion
of the assumed risk defense in cigarette tort litigation, see Robert L. Rabin, .4 Sociolegal
History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853 (1992) (exploring the role of
assumed risk and warning labels in the two waves of tobacco tort litigation).
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The same cannot be said, however, for a number of related
problems that have been much discussed in the toxic tort literature,
beginning with the issue of probabilistic recovery. 4 It is a safe assumption that whatever the risk threshold for designating a particular chemical substance as a listed toxic, in virtually every instance of
mass harm there will remain a fairly substantial residual-but
unidentifiable-number of cases that are a consequence of background conditions of living. Thus, if ingestion of a designated drug
increases the risk of liver cancer from four to nine in every thousand
members of an "exposed" population, it continues to be the case
that four victims of the disease in each cohort have succumbed because of pathological circumstances that remain independent of the
toxic substance in question. If, in fact, all nine victims are allowed
to claim against the fund, payment of full compensation to each
victim would exceed the appropriate level of activity-related
disbursements.
One method for dealing with this problem would be to allow
each of the claimants five-ninths of the recovery otherwise available
from the fund. There are, however, a number of possible objections
to this resolution of the issue. At a pragmatic level, probabilistic
recovery is based on a set of assumptions about scientific certainty
in assessing risk that may be necessary in establishing thresholds for
recovery, but certainly become problematic as a mechanism for pinpointing precise recovery levels in individual cases.8 5 From an accident-prevention perspective, there are additional reasons for
doubting the wisdom of probabilistic recovery. Even if financing is
keyed to risk enhancement, the fund approach departs from the optimal deterrence model in any event because intangible loss is borne
by the claimant. Hence, it is something of an illusory search for
fine-tuned injury prevention to adopt a highly refined probabilistic
approach to recovery. Finally, from a compensation perspective,
the trade-off notion that is a fundamental premise of no-fault "insurance" is undermined by reducing recovery significantly below a
reasonable approximation of full economic loss.
With these considerations in mind, there is a strong case for
rejecting a discount in individual recoveries to the level of probabil84. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 31, at 898-900; Glen 0. Robinson, .ldtiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713, 759-67 (1982).
85. Indeed, the existing scientific uncertainty about toxicity levels may be so great as
to undermine generally the advisability of adopting an administrative compensation
scheme. This fundamental issue is discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes
97-101.
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istic loss.8" In fact, none of the existing or proposed disease-related
no-fault schemes appears to take seriously the prospect of riskdriven reductions in the level of reparation for economic loss, despite the obvious fact that "too many" claims are recognized as a
consequence. As in the case of the Black Lung program, the more
appealing strategy could be simply to tighten up the threshold standard (presumption) for recovery.8 7
Apart from probabilistic recovery, two relatively new departures in damages, which have achieved some prominence in toxic
tort cases, deserve consideration. Both types of claims arise out of a
central characteristic of toxic harms-the long latency period between exposure and actual awareness of injury. In the interim, particularly when early claims begin to receive publicity, individuals
who have been exposed to a toxic substance may incur tangible expense for medical monitoring and experience intangible "loss" derived from fear of injury.8 8
Allowing recovery for fear of injury, however realistic the concern, seems inconsistent with the basic purposes of a no-fault
scheme. The insurance underpinning for administrative compensation would be seriously compromised by individualized, case-bycase determinations of subjective reactions to health concerns; the
determinations would be extraordinarily costly to reach and the
temptations to inflate claims would be substantial. In the alternative, a scheduled lump-sum approach might be adopted, but it is
difficult to devise a standard that would fall short of virtually automatic recovery for every exposure victim. If general pain and suffering is to be excluded from a compensation scheme, there seems to
be no substantial argument for treating fear of harm in a different
fashion.
By contrast, medical monitoring expenses are a form of economic loss that raise none of the preceding valuation problems, and
clearly "arise out of"-under a liberal construction of the termexposure to a toxic substance. As a consequence, there is no reason
in principle for denying recovery to claimants simply on the basis
that they have not yet contracted the disease. But recovery might be
86. These considerations primarily relate to no-fault compensation, and as a consequence, do not, in themselves, override the arguments in favor of probabilistic recovery
in product and environmental cases within the tort system.
87. For discussion of the use of presumptions in the Coal Miners' Health and Safety
Act, see BARTH, supra note 3, at 109-28.
88. For a discussion of the "fear of injury" case law, see MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 309-11 (5th ed.

1992).
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systematically denied on purely pragmatic grounds if the universe of
potential claimants against the fund is adjudged likely to be so large
that the fiscal demands of reimbursing monitoring costs would be
politically unacceptable. This is not an issue that can (or need be)
resolved here, but it would have to be addressed in a detailed version of a toxic no-fault approach.
C. Deciding Whether to Retain the Tort System
Some of the issues addressed in the preceding discussion are
closely linked with whether the tort system is to be retained above
the limits of the administrative compensation scheme. For example,
there is a weaker argument for lump-sum intangible loss awards
within the no-fault scheme if the tort system is retained above some
threshold definition of "serious" injury. Similarly, any wage-loss
ceilings adopted under a compensation scheme might be set at
more modest levels in recognition of the continuing prospect of
residual tort liability.
In practice, the tort system has been retained in some no-fault
schemes and eliminated in others. Workers' compensation systems
are intended to serve as a replacement for tort liability, although
third-party liability suits constitute a significant qualification to the
exclusivity principle. 89 By contrast, even the most generous automobile no-fault schemes have retained the tort system for wage loss
and intangible harm above the limits established in the legislation.9 °
As indicated earlier, the vaccine, Superfund and ELI no-fault models each retain the tort system, either as an alternative or supplementary avenue of recourse. 9
The distinctive characteristics of the mass toxic harm problem
counsel strongly against retaining a supplementary tort remedy.
There is an important difference between auto accidents and mass
toxic harm; in the case of auto accidents, the vast majority of claims
are for relatively minor injuries that can be fully compensated within
a moderately generous no-fault scheme. A principal aim of retaining a residual tort remedy is to address the relatively small percentage of cases that involve very serious injuries. By contrast, past
experience with mass toxic harms suggests that a very substantial
proportion of the claims is likely to satisfy any reasonable definition
89. See Paul C. Weiler, Workers' Compensation and Product LiabilitV: The Interaction of a
Tort and a Non-Tort Regime, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 825, 834-38 (1989) (examining the rise in

third-party liability suits).
90. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAw § 5104 (McKinney 1985).

91. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67.
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of "serious" injury. As a consequence, a major purpose of adopting
an administrative compensation approach-reducing the high litigation costs associated with a mass toxics incident-is likely to be defeated by a supplementary tort remedy. If tort continues to be
available, judicial dockets are likely to remain overburdened by
large numbers of claims, massive numbers of tort litigants are likely
to incur huge administrative costs, and many will experience interminable conflict over the range of legal issues that has come to characterize these cases. 92
The asbestos litigation is, in fact, illustrative of the problem.
Because of the opportunity for third-party litigation, the workers'
compensation system has, in effect, functioned as a non-exclusive
forum for asbestos-related injuries with tort liability playing a major
supplementary role. As a consequence, the compensation scheme
has been tantamount to a financing mechanism for tort litigation,
which has imposed enormous costs on all concerned.9"
The arguments for tort liability as a mutually exclusive alternative form of relief, as distinguished from a supplementary source of
compensation, are somewhat different. The strongest argument for
retaining tort as an alternative pathway for mass toxics victims is an
abiding popular suspicion of "welfare" programs. First, there is the
political concern that the ceilings on compensation-particularly for
lost wages-would simply be set too low, or allowed to fall below
continuing inflationary effects on the economy. Mindful of the private alternative of voluntarily purchased loss insurance, the prospect of inadequate compensation levels remains a real concern.
Second, there is a bureaucratic concern that the system, despite its
reliance on a science panel and presumably independent hearing
boards, might exhibit undue conservatism in the face of a staggering

92. This is not, however, an inevitable result. If the ceilings under an administrative
compensation scheme were sufficiently high and no double recovery in tort were allowed, the scheme in effect might serve as an exclusive remedy. To put it otherwise, if
secondary reliance on the tort system offered only the prospect of intangible loss discounted by attorneys' fees and litigation costs, recourse to the tort system might not be a
particularly attractive option. If intangible loss in the residual tort system were capped,
tort litigation would become still less desirable. The point is that various approaches to
retaining tort as a supplementary system of relief are available-through manipulating
either the basic compensation scheme, the residual tort system, or both-which, at the
extreme, in effect foreclose the tort option once administrative compensation has been
afforded.
93. See, e.g., Donald L. Spatz, Issues in Asbestos Disease Compensation, in CURRENT ISSUES
IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION 300-03 (James R. Chelius ed., 1986).
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volume of claims for catastrophic loss. 9 4 Finally, there is the fairness concern that any administrative compensation system, because
it does cap recovery at some level, is bound to be least generous to
the most devastatingly disabled (counting pain and suffering as a
real, albeit unrecoverable, element of loss). Thus, whatever its virtues, many observers would recoil at the prospect of making the administrative compensation scheme truly exclusive.
The question is whether the tort system can remain open as a
"fail-safe" alternative without diverting so many cases from a wellfunctioning administrative scheme as to make the reform effort meaningless. As an initial measure, claimants would have to be put to a
binding choice between the two alternative systems. Unless recourse to tort constitutes an irrevocable waiver of no-fault compensation, the asbestos experience will be replayed: claimants will
almost invariably sue in tort, even though they have recovered statutory benefits. In addition, the tort remedy should be sharply constrained by placing a relatively low ceiling on recovery of noneconomic loss and revoking the collateral-source rule for other
nontort benefits. These measures, along with the intrinsic uncertainties of tort law, should suffice to ensure that claimants would opt
out of the compensation scheme only in circumstances where it was
failing to fulfill its basic purposes.
D. Financing the System
Typically, a no-fault scheme is financed through charges imposed on those parties engaged in the injury-producing activity. Beyond that common ground, however, there is considerable
divergence among systems in the effort to promote accident prevention by experience-rating the contributors: workers' compensation
systems in practice generally attempt to fine-tune premium rates, to
some extent, to the risks associated with various occupations; automobile no-fault premiums, by contrast, are not particularly sensitive
to accident involvement. 95 The two toxic no-fault proposals dis94. There are other scenarios, as well. The compensation system might, for example, be resistant to reversing course in the face of new scientific evidence because of
image considerations.
The bureaucratic resistance to Agent Orange claims is discussed in SCHUCK, supra
note 5, at 24, 78-79. Whether the agency's recalcitrance was motivated by mass claim
and/or image considerations is a matter of conjecture, but the possibilities certainly cannot be ruled out.
95. The New Zealand comprehensive no-fault system has been challenged by American critics because of its relative indifference to the goal of cost internalization. See, e.g.,
Miller, The Future, supra note 21, at 34-35, 76-77; James A. Henderson, Jr., The .Vew Zea-
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cussed earlier exhibit a similar divergence within the same general
area. The ELI proposal would adopt a phased-in hazard fee reflecting the risk-generating character of contributing enterprises, while,
to the contrary, the Superfund proposal would establish a flat tax on
petroleum products and chemical feedstocks.9 6
From a deterrence perspective, it is far from clear that the
choice between a flat-tax and a risk-sensitive schedule of charges
makes any substantial difference. The doubts are similar to those
expressed about the tort system's injury-prevention potential in
toxic harm cases; the unforeseeability of the risk at the time of production, disagreement over an appropriate discount rate, disinclination of management to consider long-term consequences, and long
latency, generally, between exposure and illness undermine the preventive potential of any liability system. 9 7 Moreover, there are parallel regimes of regulatory control-in particular, CERCLA and
RCRA in the hazardous waste area 98 and the Food and Drug Administration with respect to drugs-that arguably diminish the significance of liability rules in achieving optimal deterrence. 99 Ironically,
in many of the leading cases of mass tort liability, the product has in
fact been pulled off the market or the producer is in bankruptcy
long before the overall injury toll has been recorded.
It does not follow, however, that any system of financing the
administrative compensation scheme is equally acceptable. Fairness
considerations serve as an alternative rationale for creating as close
a linkage as possible between risk-producing activities and financial
responsibility for the consequences. In general, then, there is merit
to the ELI effort to devise a contribution scheme that reflects the
risks associated with covered sources.' 0 0
A key issue is how the fund would be financed initially, before a
historical pattern of compensation claims can be established. It
would probably be necessary to rely at the outset upon a flat tax
linked to gross revenues, rather than a system of charges fine-tuned
landAccident Compensation Reform, 48 U. CMI. L. REV. 781, 794-98 (1981) (reviewing GEOFFREY PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY (1979)).

96. See supra text accompanying note 58.
97. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibilit-v: The Dilemma
of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REV. 845, 883-84 (1987); Strand, supra note 5, at 600-07.
98. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-92k (1988).
99. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Awav with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555, 563-64
(1985).
100. See supra text accompanying note 59.
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to injury-generating conduct. Eventually, however, the claims and
payout records of the fund would provide the raw data for phasing
in a hazard-derived schedule of charges to replenish the fund on a
periodic basis. In the alternative, the fund could be given a right of
subrogation against the sources of compensation claims. Because
exposure to some identifiable source would be a standard requirement for establishing a claim in the first instance, the data required
for either a schedule of hazard charges or a subrogation strategy
presumably would be readily at hand.
III.

THE UNEASY CASE FOR A COMPENSATION SCHEME

Many supporters of the tort system would agree that the traditional two-party corrective justice model of tort liability is inadequate for dealing with mass toxic tort cases. They would contend,
however, that the tort system can be substantially restructured to
address the most significant problems created by these singularly
complex catastrophic occurrences of product and environmental
harm."° ' Thus, in an effort to reduce administrative costs and promote evenhanded treatment of similarly situated injury claimants, a
hybrid tort process could be established whereby cases would be
transferred to a single federal court, consolidated for pretrial discovery and subsequent adjudication, disaggregated when appropriate for test case resolution of representative claims, disposed of
through recourse to probabilistic recovery and proportionate liability, limited to single awards of punitive damages, and subjected,
generally, to whatever further innovative measures appeared consistent with fair and efficient resolution of the controversies. 0 2 Unquestionably, these techniques would be a constructive response to
the justified criticism of traditional tort-system performance in litigation over products such as asbestos and DES.
There is a substantial basis, however, for pessimism about the
efficacy of these techniques. If the litigation involving asbestos,
DES, Agent Orange, the Nevada atomic tests, and the like is subjected to close scrutiny, one finds collateral issues-insurer respon101. See, e.g., ABA COMMISSION

ON MASS TORTS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(1989); Mullenix, supra note 81; Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A
Proposed FederalProcedureAct, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1039 (1986) (proposing streamlined procedures for resolving mass tort cases within the context of the traditional tort system);
David Rosenberg, Comment, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons from a
Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REV. 695 (1989) (proposing a model of collective processing
and criticizing attempts to supplant the tort system with insurance schemes).
102. For discussions of these and other aggregative techniques, see sources cited
supra note 81.
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sibility, the government-contractor
defense, governmental
immunity, and choice of law, among others-as well as mutual recrimination and antagonism among attorneys, which invariably result in multiple appeals, staggering litigation costs, and long
delays.'0 3 While it is impossible to predict the precise focus of these
collateral disputes and delays in future cases, they have occurred
just as inexorably in innovatively handled mass tort conflicts as in
traditional serial litigation. It thus seems fair to assume that the tort
system will continue to labor under the weight of its institutional
inadequacies in these controversies.
Unfortunately, however, the superiority of a no-fault approach
is far from clear. Initially, there is the core question of whether a
toxics-listing mechanism, linked to a presumption of liability, is
likely to function more efficaciously than the costly, time-consuming
causal inquiry in the tort system. Most such listing mechanisms,
such as the Proposition 65-originated governor's list of carcinogens
and reproductive toxicants mandated in California's Safe Drinking
Water and Toxic Enforcement Initiative of 1986,'04 have been established for purposes of requiring product warnings or prohibiting
releases of pollutants-above prescribed limits-into the water or
air. They have not purported to establish a foundation for individual claims of personal harm; and even the scientific underpinnings
of their more modest objectives have been the subject of heated
controversy. 10 5 In Japan, pioneering legislation that established a
pollution-related health damage compensation act for respiratory
illness was recently abandoned after more than a decade of controversy over the scientific basis for presuming a causal linkage between industrial sources and exposure victims.'0 6 Limited realitytesting suggests, then, that a broadly-conceived toxic harm standard
103. Limitations on attorneys' fees and the disposition of later-arising claims are two
other illustrative examples of recurring issues. See generally ALI REPORT, Supra note 72
(providing a detailed treatment of collective judicial procedures in mass toxics cases).
104. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25180.7, 25189.5, 25192, 25249.5 to 25249.13
(West 1992).
105. See, e.g., EDWARD J. BURGER, JR. ET AL., CLEAN WATER AND Toxic WASTE: AT
WHAT COST FOR WHAT GAIN? AN ANALYSIS OF CALIFORNIA'S PROPOSITION 65 (National
Legal Center for the Public Interest 1989); Judith A. DeFranco, Comment, California's
Toxics Initiative: Making It Work, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1195 (1988) (arguing for extensive
regulatory interpretation to reduce uncertainty and vagueness in the language of the
statute).

106. See Alice Stewart, Comment,Japan's 1987 Amendment to the 1973 Pollution-Related
Health Damage Compensation Law: Tort Reform and Administrative Compensation in Comparative
Perspective, 29 HARV. INT'L L.J. 475 (1988) (discussing the genesis of the compensation
law, criticisms of its mechanisms, and the reforms that phased out the core provisions of
the scheme).
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may be overambitious in its reach, given the current state of scientific learning. 0 7
If so, the main source of toxic harm claims under the scheme
might well be a new generation of high-volume tort litigation transferred into the administrative compensation system: the next wave
of asbestos and Dalkon Shield-type cases. Because the early-arising
injury claims in these nascent mass toxics cases would have no initial
recourse to the administrative compensation system,' 0 8 the efficacy
of a switching mechanism is critical. At the outset, vital questions of
timing arise. If the transfer trigger is set too early, indispensable
information that would have been uncovered through pretrial discovery may remain inaccessible. On the other hand, if the trigger is
set too late, pretransfer litigation costs may mount to the point
where the savings through eventual administrative disposition are
negligible.
Another timing issue centers on the role of the science panel in
making a generic determination of adequate proof of causation. If
the panel advises the transferring court on the issue of adequate
causation, the question arises whether-in terms of expertise gains,
at least-the administrative process offers much in the way of benefits as compared to a restructured tort system, which could similarly
employ the panel if consolidation were effected. By contrast, if the
science panel reviews the evidence after transfer, there are difficult
questions regarding the potential revitalization of tort claims if the
panel finds insufficient evidence of causation to support a generic
determination of toxic harm.
Entirely apart from timing issues, the threshold need to designate a compensable event raises a host of questions about comparative institutional competence that are not easily answered. Once a
107. There are, of course, other models of no-fault schemes in which compensation
for activity-related disease is recognized. The closest counterpart of compensation for
broadly defined toxic harms is workers' compensation. The causal nexus in workers'
compensation is, however, established from a different perspective-namely, whether
the harm was work-related or not. The performance of workers' compensation boards
underscores the reservations expressed in the text; reportedly, the administrative determinations are costly and controversial because the scientific data in support of these
claims are frequently so problematic. See PETER S. BARTH, WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND
WORK-RELATED ILLNESSES AND DISEASES 255-57, 268-69 (1980); Leslie I. Boden, Problems
in Occupational Disease Compensation, in CURRENT ISSUES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION,
supra note 93, at 315-18.
108. Toxic exposures that remain isolated events, characterized by traditional proof
of individual causation (e.g., a doctor's testimony), as suggested throughout this discussion, simply do not raise sufficiently distinctive issues to warrant inclusion under a focused no-fault replacement of tort liability.
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generic determination of causal relationship between source and
harm has been reached, is it preferable to have individual exposure
or harm claims decided by an administrative board or a jury? If
these decisions involve subcategorization and representative-case
treatment, are they better handled through an administrative process, adjudication, or alternative dispute resolution? Does the prospect of consolidated pretrial settlement (in a reformed tort system)
offset the cost advantages of relatively informal administrative dispositions on a case-by-case (or subcategory-wide) basis?
The funding of a broad-based administrative compensation
scheme-anticipating mass toxics claims from drug as well as pollution-related environmental injuries-poses another set of difficult
questions. Whether the fund is financed by a gross revenue-based
or experience-rated tax, there would undoubtedly be serious objections to an allocation scheme that "mixed apples and oranges"that is, required contributions both from exposure-related and ingestion-related sources of toxic harm. Yet, as we have seen, a
broad-based toxic no-fault scheme-of necessity-would have to
offer expansive coverage of environmental and pharmaceutical
harms if it were to encompass the major instances of mass injury
claims. These objections could be met, in part, by designing a subrogation feature into the financing scheme. But this initiative, in
turn, would raise legitimate questions about the continuing comparative cost-effectiveness of an administrative compensation approach.
Because a working version of a mass toxics administrative compensation scheme has never been fully implemented, it is impossible
to answer all of these questions with real confidence. Nonetheless,
if there were a clear prospect of a significant number of discrete
mass tort cases occurring in the future, on the scale of asbestos and
Dalkon Shield-in other words, tens of thousands of related claims
arising over a period of years on a nationwide basis in state and federal courts-the case for resorting to a broad-based no-fault scheme
would be very strong. From a compensation perspective, the tort
system simply is not designed to handle a massive volume of related
claims in a relatively uniform, cost-efficient method. Even if generic
and individual causation issues can be handled in a quasi-administrative fashion through innovative restructuring of the tort process,
there is no reason to be sanguine about diminishing the excesses of
inventive-and disruptive-lawyering strategies on collateral issues.
Another scenario, however, not inconsistent with developments
over the past decade, would be that the next generation of mass
toxics personal injury cases will be sporadic hazardous waste litiga-
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tion, rather than a new outburst of asbestos-type catastrophes.
These cases would involve geographically and numerically circumscribed clusters of "neighborhood" exposure claims, along with an
occasional pharmaceutical case in the numerosity range of Bendectin and MER/29-that is, a volume in the upper range of one thousand cases. Although the tort system has not earned high marks for
its disposition of these controversies, aggregative techniques may
offer sufficient promise-given the uncertainties about the actual
performance of an administrative compensation system and the lack
of political support for such a scheme (in the absence of a crisis atmosphere)-to counsel against tort replacement under present circumstances. This scenario counsels a wait-and-see attitude.
Administrative compensation schemes offer greatest promise
when the compensation-triggering "event" features a relatively
clear relationship between source, substance, and pathological condition. Vaccine-related harms are a good example; radiation exposure cases, arising out of a nuclear reactor mishap, arguably would
also provide sufficient clarity. In such cases, no-fault has the dual
advantage of providing an insurance principle for awarding compensation and assigning losses commensurate with more optimal
deterrence. When one ventures, however, into the unconfined area
of mass toxic harms, administrative compensation schemes share
many of the burdens that beset a reconstructed aggregative tort liability approach.

